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NOTES
THE PLIGHT OF THE SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH: A LEGISLATIVE BLUNDER
AND JUDICIAL ACQUIESCENCE
I. Introduction
Due to the acute sensitivity of the interests which they threaten, sex crimes
have consistently provoked the most intense public reaction. Hence the develop-
ment of a popular conviction that there exists a specially distinct class of men-
tally defective sex offenders who should not be imprisoned but placed within
a peculiarly orientated program of psychiatric treatment.' Couched in hysteria
and sensationalism, the populace demanded a more effective handling of the
serious sex offender.' The "Sexual Psychopath" and "Sexually Dangerous Person"
laws appeared to satisfy this urgency as reflected with the enactment in the past
twenty-eight years of such specialized legislation in over half the state jurisdic-
tions and the District of Columbia.' These statutes were initially thought to be
progressive and enlightened, a well-reasoned attempt to protect the public from
brutal sex crimes while at the same time protecting and hopefully rehabilitating
the offender.4 While identifying the psychopath as abnormal but not legally
insane, they represent a significant advance of psychiatry into the legal order
by providing for the civil commitment, isolation and treatment of the psychopath
rather than his incarceration.
The legislation emphasizes both the protection and security of society and
the rehabilitation of the psychopath himself. The New Hampshire statute
typifies these optimistic objectives:
It is hereby declared that the frequency of sex crimes within this state
necessitates that appropriate measures be adopted to protect society more
adequately from aggressive sexual offenders; that the laws of this .state do
not provide for the proper disposition of those who commit or have a
tendency to commit such crimes and whose actions result from a psycho-
pathic condition; that society as well as the individual will benefit by a
civil commitment which would provide for indeterminate segregation and
1 For general discussions of the rationale underlying sexual psychopathy statutes, see
Cavanagh, Sexual Anomalies and the Law, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 4 (1963); Cohen, Administra-
tion of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Statute in Indiana, 32 IND. L.J. 450 (1957); Hacker
and Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 766
(1955).
2 TAPPAN, REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY COMMISSION ON THE HABITUAL SEX OF-
FENDER 13 (1950):
Their popularity must be attributed in the main not to any foundation in fact
for their adoption, but to the exploitation of the peculiarly intense anxieties about
sex crimes that most people feel: the channels of publicity have been receptive
mainly to the rabidly distorted declarations of ill-informed, often hysterical prophets
of calamity.
See also SUTHERLAND & CRESSY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 127 (5th ed. 1955).
3 See Appendix.
4 The following cases contain typical statements of the two-fold purpose of the legisla-
tion: People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.App.2d 336, 246 P.2d 913, 918 (1952); LaMorre v.
Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 347 Mass. 534, 199 N.E.2d 204, 206 (1964);
State v. Noll, 171 Neb. 831, 108 N.W.2d 108, 111 (1961). See generally Cohane, Psychia-
try and the Criminal Law, 1 Am. J. MED. JUR. 152 '(1938); MARYLAND LEaISLATIVE CouN-
cL, AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW FOR DEFECTIVE DELINQUENTS 2 (No. 29, 1950).
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treatment of such persons; that the necessity in the public interest for the
provisions hereinafter enacted is a matter of legislative determination. 5
The power of a state legislature to frame legislation in this area is predicated
upon two considerations: 1) the police power of the state, and 2) the doctrine
of parens patriae. The constitutionality of these statutes has uniformly been held
to be a reasonable and valid exercise of the police power of the state.' In up-
holding such a statute, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated the usual rationale:
Under its police power the State may also enact a new procedure both
curative in purpose and rehabilitating in objective, and which substitutes
treatment and cure for punishment. . . .This must be particularly true
where (as to the instant Act) one purpose of the legislation is the protec-
tion of the public from indecent advances or criminal attack by those whom
the State has the power to classify as mentally ill and the right to confine
and attempt to cure.7
According to the doctrine of parens patriae, the state has the power to legislate
in response to a particularized harm or threat to society as where a group of
people are found to be dangerous to the health or morals of its citizens.'
. Born in an atmosphere of public acerbity and indignation, these statutes
form a highly controversial body of social legislation, and have failed to live up
to the expectations which originally surrounded their enactment. It shall be the
scope of this article to compare and examine the vital provisions of the statutes
and the litigation created in their aftermath.
II. Statutory Contrast and Comparison
The basic dissimilarity which underscores many aspects of this legislation
is first indicated by the variance with which the states designate the mentally
abnormal sex offender. Ten states term the offender as either a "Criminal Sexual
Psychopath" or as a "Sexual Psychopath."9 Two jurisdictions describe him as
a "Sexually Dangerous Person"1 while in nine states he is merely referred to
as a person convicted of certain specified crimes.11 Four states term him a "Sex
5 N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 173:1 (repl. vol. 1964).
6 United States ex re. Gerchman v. Maroney, 235 F.Supp. 588, 593 (W.D.Pa. 1964);
People ex rel. Elliott v. Juergens, 407 Ill. 391, 95 N.E.2d 602, 605 (1950) ; People v. Piasecki,
333 Mich. 122, 52 N.W.2d 626, 630 (1952); State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383, 133 N.W.2d
583, 588 (1965).
7 State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897, 902 '(1950).
8 Id. at 902; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization); Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904) (compulsory vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. State Board of
Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (quarantine); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267
(1943) (venereal disease).
9 Ar.L CODE tit. 15, §434 (Supp. 1963); D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3503 '(1961); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §917.12 (Supp. 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3401 (repl. vol. 1956); IOwA CODE
ANN. §225A.1 (Supp. 1964); MiOH. STAT. ANN. §28.967(1) '(1954); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§202.700 (1959); NEB. RaV. STAT. §29-2901 (1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §173:2 (repl.
vol. 1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.06.010 (1962).
10 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1964); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123A,
§1 (1965).
11 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §17-244 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-1534 (1964);
OaR. REV. STAT. §137.111 (Supp. 1963); S.D. CODE §13.1727 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE
ANN. §77-49-1 (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. §53-278.2 '(repl. vol. 1958); W.VA. CODE
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Offender"' 2 but Ohio classifies him as a "Psychopathic Offender."' 3 In Ver-
mont he is considered a "Psychopathic Personality."' 4 California amended its
law in 1963 so that it now deals with a "Mentally Disordered Sex Offender."'"
The efforts of the state legislatures in defining the sexual psychopath or his
equivalent have resulted in widespread ambivalence and inconsistency. In gen-
eral, the definition of the sexually psychopathic person, or its statutory equiva-
lent, incorporates two essential elements: (1) an overt act- often a charge
or conviction of a sex crime; and (2) a specified yet divergently defined state
of mind. The second element has proved a great source of consternation to the
legislative craftsmen. Basically, the sexual psychopath is considered to be suf-
fering from such an unstable personality that his sexual behavior contravenes
both the law and the social norms of propriety while demonstrating a compulsive
predisposition toward the commission of sexual offenses. The legislative defini-
tions are clearly lacking in exactness chiefly because they try to translate into
statutory language what is already a vague and indefinite medical concept.
Ohio offers a meaningful example of the inherent inability of a state legislature
to depict with any degree of specificity the condition of psychopathy:
'Psychopathic offender' means any person who is adjudged to have a
psychopathic personality, who exhibits criminal tendencies and who by
reason thereof is a menace to the public. Psychopathic personality is evi-
denced by such traits or characteristics inconsistent with the age of such
person, as emotional immaturity and instability, impulsive, irresponsive,
reckless, and unruly acts, excessively self-centered attitudes, deficient powers
of self-discipline, lack of normal capacity to learn from experience, marked
deficiency of moral sense or control.' 6
Washington offers little more intelligibility although it utilizes an apparently
scientific standard, defining a sexual psychopath as ". . . any person who is
affected in a form of psychoneurosis or in a form of psychopathic personality,
which form predisposes such person to the commission of sexual offenses in a
degree constituting him a menace to the health or safety of others."'"
The vexation of the legislature in this regard is frequently reflected by the
general and all-inclusive terms found in the definitions. One state initially pin-
points the offender as one convicted "... for any offense against public morals
and decency, as relating to crimes pertaining to sex, in which perversion or
mental aberration, appears to be or is involved . . ." but then destroys any
precision it might have achieved by adding ".... or where the defendant appears
to be mentally ill. . . ."" New Hampshire appears to have expanded the con-
dition of sexual psychopathy into one co-extensive with insanity:
ANN. §2666(1), (2) (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §959.15 (1), (2) (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§7-348(a) (Supp. 1965).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §39-19-1 (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:164-3 (1953); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §1166 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. §33-1301 (Supp. 1965).
13 OHio Rav. CODE ANN. §2947.24(B) (Page Supp. 1964).
14 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §2816 (1959).
15 CAL. WEL1ARE & INST'NS CODE §5500 '(1966).
16 OH o REv. CODE ANN. §2947.24(B) (Page Supp. 1964).
17 WAsH. Rv. CODE ANN. §71.06.010 (1962).
18 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-1534 (1964).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The term 'sexual psychopath' . . . means any person suffering from such
conditions of emotional instability or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of
customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the con-
sequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render
such person irresponsible with respect to sexual matters and thereby danger-
ous to himself or to other persons.19
The Iowa statute, however, explicitly differentiates between psychopathy and
mental illness by limiting the designation of "criminal sexual psychopath" to
those ".... who are suffering from a mental disorder and are not a proper sub-
ject for the schools for the mentally retarded or for commitment as a mentally
ill person, having criminal propensities toward the commission of sex offenses,
and who may be considered dangerous to others, . . ."o One state takes a
comparatively plausible approach, defining a "sexually dangerous person" as
one who by his repetitive or compulsive misconduct in sexual matters has shown
"a general lack of power to control his sexual impulses."'" Perhaps the best
reasoned solution to this perplexing problem of legislative definition is that
adopted by those jurisdictions which define the psychopath or dangerous sex
offender as one convicted of variously enumerated sex crimes thereby avoiding
the precariousness of delineating a particular type of emotional behavior.22
However, by refraining from a description of a psychiatric or mental imbalance,
these statutes provide no scientific criteria whatsoever by which a sound medical
judgment that the offender is actually mentally ill may be formulated. In gen-
eral, it becomes obvious that the definition of the sexual psychopath remains
essentially unsettled, undefined and obscure, and by its nature lends itself toward
ambiguity, misconstruction and interpretative distortion.
The same disparity and divergence which plagues the definition of the
sexual psychopath also permeates the statutory framework concerning the basis
of jurisdiction. Typically, an individual is brought under these statutes by
being charged or convicted of one of several listed sexual offenses. Fifteen states
specifically permit a petition alleging sexual psychopathy or a similarly related
condition to be filed upon the conviction of the defendant of certain sexual
offenses.22 Thus New Jersey provides:
19 N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. §173:2 (repl. vol. 1964).
20 IOWA CODE ANN. §225A.1 (Supp. 1964); see generally Fahr, Iowa's New Sexual
Psychopath Law-An Experiment Noble in Purpose?, 41 IowA L. REV. 523 (1956).
21 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123A, §1 (1965).
22 See statutes cited note 11 supra; representative is the Wyoming statute which reads in
pertinent part:
Whenever any person is convicted of or pleads guilty to any one or more of the
following crimes, as defined in the following sections of Wyoming Statutes 1957:
Indecent exposure . .. , rape . . ., attempt to commit rape . . ., incest . . ., sodomy
... seduction . .. , taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child
under eighteen (18) years of age . . ., knowingly committing any immoral, indecent,
or obscene act in the presence of any child under eighteen (18) years of age and
causing or encouraging any child under eighteen '(18) years of age to cause or
encourage any other child to commit or attempt to commit with the person con-
victed, any immoral or indecent act . . . and accosting, annoying or molesting any
child under the age of eighteen (18) years, with intent to commit any unlawful act.
... Wyo. STAT. ANN. §7-348(a) (Supp. 1965).
23 See statutes cited note 11 supra; in those states however, -the designation and defini-
tion of the offender is co-extensive with the basis of jurisdiction. Several jurisdictions do dif-
ferentiate between definition and basis of jurisdiction further illustrating the inconsistency in
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Whenever a person is convicted of the offense of rape, carnal abuse, sodomy,
open lewdness, indecent exposure or impairing the morals of a minor, or
of an attempt to commit any of the aforementioned offenses, or assault
with intent to commit rape, carnal abuse or sodomy, the judge shall order
the commitment of such person to the diagnostic center for a period not
to exceed 60 days.24
Two states, New Hampshire 5 and Washington,26 extend jurisdiction when the
alleged psychopath is charged with variously enumerated sexual offenses. Ala-
bama takes a compromising position by requiring either a charge or a convic-
tion of any sex crime. California extends coverage to include a person con-
victed of any offense, whether a sex offense or not, if it appears to the satisfac-
tion of the court that there is probable cause for finding such person a mentally
disordered sex offender, whereupon the proceedings may be suspended and the
person certified for examination within the meaning of the statute.2" The Wis-
consin statute is singular in its provision that conviction of a sex crime is a
sufficient jurisdictional basis but adds that "sex crime" within the meaning of
the statute,
... includes any crime except homicide or attempted homicide if the court
finds that the defendant was probably directly motivated by a desire for
sexual excitement in the commission of the crime; and for that purpose
the court may in its discretion take testimony after conviction if necessary
to determine that issue. 29
Vermont confers jurisdiction merely upon the conviction of a felony or a mis-
demeanor for the third time," but the jurisdictional requirements are more
easily satisfied in Illinoiss and Missouri 2 where one need only be charged with
any criminal offense. Florida, Indiana and Michigan demand, with few excep-
tions, only a charge or conviction of any crime."s Minnesota, Nebraska and the
District of Columbia offer a most liberal construction; no charge or conviction
of a crime is necessary but only facts presented which demonstrate that good
cause exists for judicial inquiry.3 4 While this approach is probably justified on
the theory that it provides for the identification and confinement of a psychopath
before his abnormality is allowed to express itself through overt behavior with
these statutes from state to state. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §39-19-1 (1963); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 123A, §4 (1965); OHio Rnv. CODE ANN. §2947.25 '(Page Supp. 1964); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, §1166 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. §33-1301 (Supp. 1965).
24 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:164-3 (Supp. 1964).
25 N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §173:3 '(repl. vol. 1964). This statute is noteworthy by also
providing that jurisdiction is acquired when facts are presented to the county attorney which
show good cause or when the offender is only arrested and charged with other specified
offenses enumerated in a later section of the statute.
26 WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. §71.06.020 (1962).
27 ALA. CODE tit. 15, §436 (Supp. 1963).
28 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §5501 (1966).
29 Wis. STAT. ANN. §959.15(2) (1958).
30 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §2813 (1959).
31 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §105-3 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
32 Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.710 (1959).
33 FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12 (Supp. 1964); INm. ANN. STAT. §9-3403 (repl. vol. 1956);
MicH. STAT. ANN. §28.967(2) (1954).
34 D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3504 (1961); MINN. STAT. ANN. §526.10 (1945); NEB. REV.
STAT. §29-2902 (1964).
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possible danger to the community, it is nevertheless a procedure which might
be easily abused. Once again, the statutory treatment of the jurisdictional pre-
requisites exposes that same heterogeneity and irregularity which pervades all
aspects of this legislative craftsmanship and lays bare the wavering incertitude
upon which the legislation is structured.
Exceptionally liberal is the Iowa statute which allows the filing of a petition
alleging sexual psychopathy by "any reputable person having knowledge that
an individual who is charged with a public offense is a criminal sexual psycho-
path as defined in this chapter.... .""3 This has the unusual effect of allowing
an individual, completely uninstructed in criminal psychology or mental illness,
to bring his opinion into play - indeed an exceptionally broad extension of dis-
cretion. Depending upon whether a conviction or merely a charge of a crime
is required for jurisdictional purposes, the criminal proceedings may be suspended
at various stages pending a determination of psychopathy.8
A petition alleging psychopathy having been filed with the court, every
statute in some form or other provides for a medical examination of the alleged
psychopath. The examining doctor directs his efforts toward an ascertainment
of whether or not the convicted or charged offender possesses a psychological or
emotional disturbance or deficiency predisposing him toward seriously abnormal
behavior as would endanger the health or safety of others."r The personal exam-
ination is normally conducted by a board of two or three psychiatrists, specially
qualified in the field of nervous disorders, after which their report is filed with
the court which makes the final determination of the mental condition of the
defendant in an immediate hearing."8 Most of the statutes require the examina-
tion to be conducted by several "qualified" or "duly licensed" physicians but
do not define what is meant by "qualified" or "licensed."' 9 Furthermore, the
typical statute prescribes, in addition to examination by individual physicians,
a medical examination consisting of a report from the staff of a state mental
hospital, the department of health or the state diagnostic center, again without
furnishing any meaningful criteria whatsoever according to which competency
35 IOWA CODE ANN. §225A.2 (Supp. 1964). See also Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.710 (1959).
36 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §5501 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-49-1 (Supp.
1965); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §7-348 (Supp. 1965).
37 See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. §137.113 (Supp. 1963):
The examining psychiatrist shall include in his report a statement as to whether
or not, in his opinion, the convicted person has any mental or emotional distur-
bance, deficiency or condition predisposing him to the commission of any crime to
a degree rendering the convicted person a menace to the health or safety of others.
The report shall also contain any other information which the examining psychia-
trist believes may aid the court in sentencing.
38 In contrast to these procedures in which a hearing is held immediately after the initial
medical examination, Indiana provides that, if upon the conclusion of the hearing and exami-
nation, it appears that the person is a criminal sexual psychopath, the person is then com-
mitted to an appropriate state psychiatric institution for an indeterminate period not to
exceed sixty days for the purpose of further observation and diagnosis. The superintendent
of the institution then files a final report upon which the final determination is made. IND.
ANN. STAT. §9-3404(d) (Supp. 1965). Similar is CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §5512
(1966).
39 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §4 (1965) ("not less than two psychiatrists"); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §526.10 (1945) ("two duly licensed doctors of medicine"); ORE. REv. STAT.
§137.112(3) (Supp. 1963) ("qualified psychiatrist, who may be either a member of the
hospital staff or a psychiatrist engaged in private practice"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§71.06.040 (1962) ("two duly licensed physicians").
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or professional skill of the staff members may be measured.4" In contrast to
defined procedures, the Iowa statute places the medical examination within
the discretion of the court, and should one be ordered, the court not only selects
the examiner but also the time and place of the examination."
Only a few states attempt to impose a standard of qualification for the
appointment of competent medical examiners. Thus Alabama describes a
qualified psychiatrist as "a reputable physician licensed to practice in the state
of Alabama who has limited his professional practice exclusively to the diagnosis
and treatment of mental and nervous disorders for a period of not less than three
years." '4 2 The Florida statute provides:
The circuit court judge shall then appoint not less than two nor more than
three qualified psychiatrists who are licensed physicians in the state and
who have directed their professional practice primarily to the diagnosis
and treatment of mental and nervous disorders for a period of not less than
five years, to make a personal examination of the alleged sexual psychopath,
directed toward ascertaining whether the person is a criminal sexual psy-
chopath.4 s
Similar is the Illinois statute which identifies a qualified psychiatrist as a
"reputable physician licensed in Illinois to practice medicine in all its branches,
who has specialized in the diagnosis and treatment of mental and nervous dis-
orders for a period of not less than 5 years.""' Utah requires only "two or more
competent and reputable physicians recognized as specialists . . . in the field of
psychiatry,"4 while Wyoming is significant by demanding only that one of the
appointed physicians be expert in psychiatry."8 The California statute is com-
paratively progressive in its attempt to specifically frame an intelligible set of
criteria according to which medical examiners are to be selected:
The judge shall appoint not less than two, nor more than three psychiatrists,
each of whom shall be a holder of a valid and unrevoked physician's and
surgeon's certificate who has directed his professional practice primarily to
the diagnosis and treatment of mental and nervous disorders for a period
of not less than five years, and at least one of whom shall be from the
medical staff of a state hospital or county psychopathic hospital, to make
a personal examination of the alleged mentally disordered sex offender,
directed toward ascertaining whether .the person is a mentally disordered
sex offender.4 7
With the exception of the California enactment, a striking similarity in the
statutory treatment of medical examinations is the manifest absence of any
40 See, e.g., CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. §39-19-2(2) (1963) ("A complete psychiatric exam-
ination shall have been made of him by the psychiatrists of the Colorado psychopathic hospi-
tal or by psychiatrists designated by the district court ... ).41 IOWA CODE ANN. §225A.4 (Supp. 1964) ("At said hearing the court shall determine
whether he shall be medically examined, if so, by whom such examination shall be conducted,
and the time and place thereof."). See also VA. CoD ANN. §53-278.3 (repl. vol. 1958).
42 ALA. CODE tit. 15, §434 (1959). -
43 FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12(2)(c) '(Supp. 1964).
44 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §105-4.01 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
45 UTAH CODE ANN. §77-49-2 (1953).
46 Wyo. STAT. ANN. §7-349 "(Supp. 1965).
47 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §5504 (1966).
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clear or definable statutory guidelines by which qualified medical examiners are
to be chosen, a defect which inherently weakens and hinders the possibility of
any effective diagnostic analysis.
After the petition has been filed alleging a person to be a sexual psychopath
and the report of the medical examination indicates he is within the respective
statutory definition of sexual psychopath, a hearing is then conducted by the
court to determine finally the question of the psychopathy of the accused and
an order and judgment are then entered in accordance with such finding and
determination. The legislatures have afforded the alleged psychopath certain
rights during the course of the hearing but again such rights are sprinkled in a
sporadic and scattered scheme. A number of jurisdictions grant the alleged
psychopath procedural rights akin to those furnished in criminal procedures -
the right of a jury trial (if demanded) and the right to counsel at every stage
of the proceeding,4" the right to cross-examine and to call his own witnesses,4"
the right to present evidence in his behalf and full rights of appeal,"0 and the
right to subpoena witnesses. 5 Several states by implication do not grant the
accused the right to a hearing; the court makes its determination solely on the
basis of the medical report filed with it. 2 In Colorado, the discretion of the
judge is controlling:
Whenever a district court, after the psychiatric examination of and report
on a person convicted of any one or more of the crimes enumerated in sec-
tion 39-19-1, shall be of the opinion that it would he to the best interests
of justice to sentence such person under provisions of this article, he shall
cause such person to be arraigned before him and sentenced to the Colorado
state penitentiary until such time as the state board of parole shall review
the case or transfer to the appropriate institution as provided in section
39-19-6.1s
Vermont provides only for a "due hearing""4 while Wisconsin resorts to a rather
unconventional procedure in which a hearing is given only after an application
for release has been made.5
The "hearing" significantly lacks many of the substantive evidentiary safe-
guards normally accorded a defendant even in a civil proceeding. The statutes
regularly consider as competent the introduction of evidence of the commission
by the alleged psychopath of any number of past crimes involving sexual moti-
vation of which the accused has been convicted together with the record of the
punishment inflicted therefor."6 New Hampshire admits the report of the medical
48 D.C. CODE ANN. §§22-3505--22-3508 (1961).
49 FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12'(2)(d) (Supp. 1964).
50 IOWA CODE. ANN. §225A.5 (Supp. 1964).
51 N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §173:5 (repl. vol. 1964).
52 KAN. STAT. ANN. §62-1536 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1170(a) (1964); UTAH
CODE ANN. §77-49-4 (1953).
53 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §39-19-5(1) (1963).
54 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §2814 (1959).
55 Wis. STAT. ANN. §959.15(6), (14) (1958).
56 ALA. CODE tit. 15, §438 (1959); D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3508 (1961) ("evidence of
conviction of any number of crimes the commission of which tends to show that the patient is
a sexual psychopath"); FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12(2) (d) (Supp. 1964) '("evidence of the
commission of said person of any number of crimes involving sexual motivation of which the
accused heretofore has been convicted"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §105-5 (Smith-Hurd
NOTES
examination into evidence at the hearing,5" whereas other states admit it but
only with the express limitation that it is not to be used in any other judicial
proceeding involving the accused other than a proceeding to determine his
psychopathy. 8 In general, the various rights and protections given the defen-
dant in a sexual psychopathic hearing are unsystematically and irregularly granted
and represent only another aspect of the derangement and perplexing unevenness
which characterizes this exceptional legislation.
Subsequent to a determination that a person is a sexual psychopath, the stat-
utes commonly provide for his commitment to the state hospital or another ap-
propriate institution where he is confined indeterminately until there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he has recovered from his condition of psychopathy or
that he no longer constitutes a danger to others.5" The indefinite terms of con-
finement again expose the inadequacy of the legislation; in Colorado, a person
found to be a sex offender within the terms of the statute, is sentenced in lieu
of the sentence provided by law for his offense "for an indeterminate term
having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life.""0 If a charge
of a crime is pending, the court may order the person to be tried upon such
charges "as the interests of substantial justice may require" and then to be com-
mitted after termination of the criminal proceedings.' In New Jersey, an
administrative official is authorized to transfer a sexual psychopath to or from
any institution within the jurisdiction for the purpose of providing for the needs
of the person according to the individual circumstances of the case. 2 This has
been interpreted to include the transfer of a sexual psychopath to the state
prison to serve the remainder of his term.6" Under such a statute, the offender
is found to be mentally ill but is nevertheless incarcerated under the provisions
of an act which is theoretically non-punitive, remedial and curative in nature.
Thus "imprisonment" is the proper type of clinical "treatment" for this par-
ticular psychopath.
Having been confined indefinitely for purposes of therapy, the sexual psy-
copath is invariably given the right to periodic examinations to determine
whether or not he has recovered although the statutes differ slightly as to the
precise procedure to be followed. Normally, application is made by the psycho-
path himself, an interested person, or the court, and the superintendent of the
hospital must certify that the offender is no longer dangerous to the health and
1964) ("evidence of the commission by the respondent of any number of crimes together with
whatever punishments, if any, were inflicted"); IOWA CODE ANN. §225A.10 '(Supp. 1964)
("Evidence of past acts of sexual deviation by the person charged shall be admissible at the
hearing"); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §5 (1965) ("past criminal and psychiatric record
and any other evidence that tends to indicate that he is a sexually dangerous person").
57 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §173:5 (rep. vol. 1964).
58 D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3506(b) '(1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12 (2) (c) (Supp. 1964);
IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3404(a) (Supp. 1965).
59 Typically, in the District of Columbia, the psychopath is confined to a hospital indefi-
nitely until ". . . the Superintendent of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital finds that he has sufficiently
recovered so as not to be dangerous to other persons.... ." D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3509 (1961).
60 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §39-19-1 (1963). See also PA. STAT: ANN. fit. 19, §1166
(1964).
61 Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.730 '(1959).
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:164-7 (1953).
63 State v. Newton, 17 N.J. 271, 111 A.2d 272, 275 (1955).
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safety of others, or that he has fully recovered.64 The California procedures for
re-examination and release are exceptionally thorough:
After a person has been committed for an indeterminate period to the
department for placement in a state hospital as a mentally disordered sex
offender and has been confined for a period of not less than 6 months from
the date of the order of commitment, the committing court may upon its
own motion or on motion by or on behalf of the person committed, require
the superintendent of the state hospital to which the person was committed
to forward to the committing court, within 30 days, his opinion under
(a) or (b) of Section 5517, including therein a report, diagnosis and recom-
mendation concerning the person's future care, supervision, or treatment.
After receipt of the report, the committing court may order the return of
the person to the court for a hearing as to whether the person is still a
mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of this article. 5
Colorado accords a psychopath the right to be examined within six months after
his confinement and at least once a year thereafter whereupon the state board
of parole decides if he should be paroled on the basis of such examination.66
The Massachusetts statute permits a hearing, and examination for discharge
every twelve months upon the filing of a written petition by the committed
person, his parents, spouse, issue, next of kin or any friend.6"
The nature of the release again differs from state to state. In Alabama,
for example, if the offender is found to have fully recovered from his psychop-
athy, he is ordered discharged from custody and placed on probation for such
a reasonable time as the circumstances may justify; if he violates the terms of
his probation, the court may either return him to the custody of the director
of the department of corrections for further treatment under the previous com-
mitment or have him serve his sentence for the crime for which he was con-
victed.6" The Colorado provision is obscure, authorizing the state board of parole
to issue an absolute release from confinement of any person sentenced under the
act "at such time and under such conditions as the interest of justice and the
welfare of society may dictate."6 9 Florida precludes any form of absolute release
by requiring the recommencement of criminal proceedings immediately upon
discharge."6 In Kansas, if after the commitment to any state or county institu-
tion, it should appear that the defendant has been mentally restored, he is then
returned to the court where he was initially convicted and sentenced or paroled
64 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12(3) (Supp. 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §105-9
'(Smith-Hurd 1964).
65 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §5519 (1966).
66 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §39-19-6 (1963).
67 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §9 (1965). See also IowA CODE ANN. §225A.12 (Supp.
1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.740 (1959); NEB. REV. STAT. §29-2906 (1964); OHIo RaV.
CODE ANN. §2947.27 (Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1172 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-49-7 (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §2815 (1959); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §7-357
(1957).
68 ALA. CODE tit. 15, §441 (1959).
69 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §39-19-7 "(1963).
70 FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12(3) (Supp. 1964) ("If criminal proceedings are still pending
against such persons then they shall recommence upon the order by the circuit court discharg-
ing the person from the institution.").
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as the court deems best under the circumstances." The pertinent section of the
Massachusetts statute, with regard to conditions of release, is particularly pliable:
The parole board shall carefully and thoroughly consider the reports of
the department of mental health concerning the progress of such person, as
well as any other information it deems relevant, and may grant such per-
son a parole permit to be at liberty upon such terms and conditions as it
shall prescribe, including the condition he receive out-patient treatment,
and any other condition that the commissioner of mental health may recom-
mend. Such terms and conditions may be revised, altered, amended or
revoked by the parole board at any time. The violation by the holder of
a parole permit to be at liberty of any of the terms or conditions of such
permit, or of any law of the commonwealth, shall render such permit void.
The parole board may revoke such permit at any time.72
Missouri extends the probationary period for a minimum of three years73 whereas
Pennsylvania merely grants parole subject to supervision.74
Disparity and dissimilarity also characterize the statutory treatment of the
effect of confinement of a sexual psychopath upon pending criminal proceedings.
The statutes of Indiana and Michigan are clearly expressive of a legislative pur-
pose to the effect that a determination of psychopathy operates as a bar to
criminal proceedings growing out of the same offense. Thus the Indiana statute
provides:
No person who is found in such original hearing to be a criminal sexual
psychopathic person, and such finding having become final, may thereafter
be tried or sentenced upon the offense with which he originally stood
charged, or convicted, in the committing court at the time of the filing of
the original petition.7
5
Although the overwhelming majority of the statutes are silent on this point,
perhaps one thread of consistency which may be isolated is the inference in many
of them that a sentence served as a sexual psychopath is a bar to subsequent
criminal prosecution. On the other hand, the Ohio approach is to return a
released psychopathic offender to a penal institution until the total period of
his confinement equals the sentence he received upon conviction; he is then
released subject to supervision.7 In Pennsylvania, the psychiatric treatment re-
ceived is in lieu of the, criminal sentence but is for an indefinite term.' Under
the Washington statute, the court has three courses of action available to it in
dealing with the offender released from treatment, dependent on the circum-
71 KAN. STAT. ANN. §62-1537 (1964). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §105-9 (Smith-
Hurd 1964).
72 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123A, §9 (1965).
73 Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.740 (1959).
74 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1173 (1964). See also Wyo. STAT. ANN. §7-352 (Supp.
1965) (probationer may receive outpatient psychiatric treatment at his own expense and in
manner prescribed by court).
75 IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3409 (repl. vol. 1956). MimH. STAT. ANN. §28.967(8) (1954),
is to the same effect.
76 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §105-9 (Smith-Hurd 1964). This provision permits
the discharge of a recovered sexual psychopath but is silent as to the resumption of any crim-
inal proceedings.
77 Omo RBv. CODe ANN. §2947.27 '(Page 1953).
78 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1166 (1964).
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stances of the confinement: (1) If the offender had been convicted of, or had
pleaded guilty to the criminal charge, and the maximum sentence for the crime
has not expired, the superintendent certifies his opinion to the board of prison
terms and paroles; (2) If the maximum sentence for the criminal charge has
ended, the superintendent paroles the psychopath under terms and conditions
he considers advisable; (3) If the maximum sentence for the criminal charge
has not ended and the sexual psychopath did not plead guilty to or was not
convicted of the charge, the superintendent returns the psychopath to the com-
mitting court which may hear and determine the criminal charge."9 Several
states explicitly provide that the confinement for psychopathy is not to operate
as a defense against a later prosecution or execution of a sentence for the criminal
offense upon which the commitment was originally based.80 Minnesota is strik-
ingly clear:
The existence in any person of a condition of psychopathic personality
shall not in any case constitute a defense to a charge of crime, nor relieve
such person from liability to be tried upon a criminal charge, unless such
person is in a condition of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, or lunacy within the
meaning of the laws relating to crimes and criminal procedure.8 '
Such a provision would seem to destroy any psychological incentive to reform
and therefore must impede any rehabilitative program since theoretically, the
treatment facilities of the state are being drawn upon for the purpose of cure
and reformation not the mere postponement of a sentence to prison. This would
appear to be the rationale underlying the provisions of several states which do
consider confinement as a sexual psychopath as a complete defense to trial or
sentence for the crime involved. The shallowness of the legislation is again
divulged by the fact that no state considers the effect of confinement as a sexual
psychopath on the statute of limitations.
III. Judicial Construction and Approval
The main thrust of the constitutional attacks upon this legislation has taken
several distinct forms but the statutes have been uniformly upheld because of
their civil or non-criminal nature; the courts have supported the civil or special
procedures of the statutes citing their stated purpose and the treatment con-
templated. In upholding the Illinois statute, that state's Supreme Court, in
People v. Redlich, 2 drew the spirit of its conclusion from an examination of
the law's express purpose:
The trial of the question of his insanity, feeble-mindedness, or psychopathy,
as defined by statute, is no part of the criminal proceedings, has no con-
nection with his guilt or innocence, and is not in aid of a determination
of that question, but the sole object of the proceeding is to ascertain the
79 WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §71.06.090 (1962).
80 D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3510 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12(3) '(Supp. 1964); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §2815 (1959).
81 MINN. STAT. ANN. §526.11 (1945).
82 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736 (1949).
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mental condition of the accused, whether or not insane, feeble-minded or
psychopathic, as defined by statute, so as to determine if he should be
required to plead to the indictment and be placed upon trial for the offense
charged.83
The same reasoning was echoed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
in In re Moulton84 where the court found the purpose of the statute to be
therapeutic, preventive and remedial, seeking the protection of society and the
benefit of the person involved, within the framework of a legitimate and worth-
while statutory method.
On only one occasion has a sexual psychopath statute been held unconsti-
tutional. In People v. Frontczak,85 the petitioner had been convicted of gross
indecency and had been committed pursuant to the Michigan statute to the
state hospital. Not unlike many of the statutes here being considered, the Michi-
gan act provided in part:
If it shall be determined and adjudged by the court that such person is
a menace to public safety for any of the reasons stated in the petition, the
court shall enter an order that said person be removed and committed to
such suitable state hospital or state institution as the court may designate
in such order, sentence to be suspended or held in abeyance during the
time such person is in the custody of such institution and such person to
remain in such state hospital or state institution until the said court, upon
application and proceedings in accordance with the provisions of section
one-a, shall find that said person has ceased to be a menace to the public
safety because of said tendencies and mental condition. Upon such finding,
such person shall be released from the custody of such hospital or institu-
tion and after allowing and crediting on the sentence originally imposed
the time spent in any such hospital or institution, the court shall return
such person to the jail or prison to which he was formerly committed, to
serve the remainder of his sentence (if any) according to law, subject to
any parole or other proper order affecting such person. 6
Although the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in striking down the statute
was premised primarily upon its insertion in the criminal code chapter relating
to judgments and sentences in criminal cases, its language nevertheless bears
substantial importance:
This enactment is more than an inquest relative to the mental condi-
tion of a prisoner because the company in which it is found is a part of
criminal procedure following conviction of a criminal offense and after
sentence and during confinement and, in the instance at bar, removed from
the jurisdiction of the trial court and domicile of the prisoner and vested
in another court, at a point removed from the prisoner's former domicile,
and where he is to be tried by a jury in a vicinage where the criminal law
has him in confinement and where he committed no crime. The statute
requires the petition to negative insanity of the prisoner, and there is no
law of the state penalizing or subjecting to hospitalization any person who
appears "to be a sex degenerate" and appears "to be suffering from a
83 Id. at 276, 83 N.E.2d at 740.
84 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26, 28 '(1951).
85 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
86 Mich. Public Acts 1937, No. 196.
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mental disorder characterized by marked sexual deviation, with tendencies
dangerous to the public safety." 87
While the court relies on the legislative scheme to invalidate the statute, it may
be inferred with appreciable force that the court actually steps beyond the
technical procedural basis of its holding and examines the substantive effect of
the statute, deciding that it punishes not for crime but rather for mental con-
clition -an invalid extension of the state's police power. Unfortunately the
careful and cautious approach enunciated in Frontczak was short-lived. In
People v. Chapman" the same court retreated from its rigid position in Frontczak
by upholding a new and very similar statute in which jurisdiction was predicated
on a charge of a criminal offense where it appears that the charged person is a
sexual psychopath. The substantive effect of the statute was very analogous to
the former enactment, but here the court drew undue significance from the
fact that the statute had been removed from the criminal code:
We are satisfied that the present statute is distinguishable and con-
tains none of the constitutional infirmities of the previous statute relating
to sex deviators, which was held unconstitutional in the Frontczak case.
The statute involved in such case was, as stated in the majority opinion,
placed in the Criminal-Code chapter relating to judgments and sentences
in criminal cases. The present statute is not contained in either the Code
of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code. It makes sex deviators subject
to restraint because of their acts and condition, and not because of con-
viction and sentence for a criminal offense. It does not extend or impose
an added or different sentence under the guise of hospitalization.8 9
The court was also influenced considerably by the fact that the former statute
contained no definition of "criminal sexual psychopath" whereas the present
statute did, although in vague and uncertain terms.90
The Chapman decision marked the point of departure for a long line of
cases in which all the features surrounding the commitment of a psychopath
have been justified as special proceedings of a civil nature collateral to the
criminal case."' An illustration of this preoccupation with the civil or rehabili-
87 People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534, 536 (1938).
88 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
89 Id. at 602-03, 4 N.W.2d at 26.
90 The definition is reproduced in all essential respects by the present definition which
reads: "Any person who is suffering from a mental disorder and is not feeble-minded, which
mental disorder is coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses is
hereby declared to be a criminal sexual psychopathic person." MicHe. STAT. ANN. §28.967(1)
(1954).
91 Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (District of Columbia);
People v. Hymes, 161 Cal.App.2d 668, 327 P.2d 219, 222 (1958) '(California); People v.
Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 47 N.E.2d 703, 705 (1943) (Illinois); People v. Piasecki, 333 Mich. 122,
52 N.W.2d 626, 629 (1952) (Michigan); State v. McfDaniels, 307 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo.App.
1957) (Missouri); State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383, 133 N.W.2d 583, 587 (1965) (Nebras-
ka); In re Mundy, 97 N.H. 239, 85 A.2d 371, 372 (1952) (New Hampshire); Cf. Hultquist
v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 Pac. 995, 997 (1925); In re Bresee, 82 Iowa 573, 48 N.W. 991,
992 (1891); State v. Linderholm, 84 Kan. 603, 114 Pac. 857 (1911); McGoldrick v. Downs,
184 Misc. 168, 53 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336 (Sup. Ct.) aff'd, 267 App. Div. 863, 56 N.Y.S.2d 533
(1945); In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d 142, 143 (1940). See generally Weihofen and
Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 TExAs L. Rav. 307, 344 '(1946).
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tative aspects of this legislation is found in the statement of the Supreme Court
of Missouri, designating-the proceeding as a civil inquesti
The purpose of a criminal proceeding is to punish. But this Act is but a
civil inquiry to determine a status. It is curative and remedial in nature
instead of punitive. . . . One of the evident purposes of the enactment is
to prevent persons suffering from this mental disorder, though "not insane
or feebleminded," from being punished for crimes they commit during the
period of this mental ailment. ' . . One purpose of the Act is to protect,
treat and cure, and the State here is concerning itself with the future well
being and return to normal living of a person so charged.92
It becomes clear that underlying the reasoning of the courts in classifying
these proceedings civil or curative in nature is the tacit assumption that the indi-
vidual will be the beneficial recipient of specially orientated psychiatric therapy to
remedy his mental aberrations. If the psychopath is not in fact receiving
special therapeutic treatment, it is not unreasonable to conclude that what might
be theoretically termed a "civil" commitment evolves in fact into a "punitive"
one. It has already been pointed out that a sexually psychopathic person may
be confined for an indefinite period despite the fact that the length of imprison-
ment for the crime with which he was charged or convicted might have been
far less.9" This precise anomaly confronted the Michigan Supreme Court in
In re Kemmerer.94 In that case, an offender who had been adjudged a sexual
psychopath applied for a writ of habeas corpus contending that the maximum
sentence on a charge of the misdemeanor (indecent exposure) which had led
to his commitment could only have been one year whereas his incarceration as
a psychopath was for an indefinite period, possibly for life, and further alleged
that he was not receiving proper treatment. The court summarily dismissed
these contentions, which action clearly exposes an inherent defect which per-
petually plagues the legislation -the absence of an objective standard by which
proper "treatment" may be measured. The court noted that it was not within
its province to fill the vacuum created by the silence of the legislature as to the
standard of "treatment":
It is not within our province to prescribe the treatment that should be
accorded petitioner. It must be borne in mind that he is not being punished,
that he is an unfortunate psychopath and that he is entitled to such treat-
ment as .his condition requires.95
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit subsequently refused a writ of
habeas corpus to petitioner Kemmerer and held that it was obliged to fol-
low the decision of the state court concerning an interpretation of a state
statute. 8 Although the evidence indicated that the, psychopath was placed
in a cell block with convicted criminals and forced to work in prison indus-
92 State ex rel Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897, 900 (1950).
93 See, e.g., COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. §39-19-1 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1166(1964).
94 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 767 (1946).
95 Id. at 317-18, 15 N.W.2d at 653.
96 Kemmerer v. Benson, 165 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1949).
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tries, the federal court remarked tersely: "These are matters for the con-
sideration of the State Hospital Commission, but even if they were incorporated
in the petition and were shown to be true, they would not justify [petitioner's]
discharge.""7 The practical import of this decision is to condone the indefinite
confinement in a prison under the shallow guise of "treatment."98 Indeed, the
courts are exceedingly reluctant to pierce the theoretically civil veil of the statutes
and lay bare the inescapable fact that in actuality they may well deprive an
individual of his substantive personal freedoms and liberties without due process.
The New Jersey legislature apparently has recognized the possibility of abuse
in this area. Its statute provides that in the event that the court shall order a
commitment of a sexual psychopath, such order shall not specify a minimum
period of commitment, "but in no event shall the person be confined or subject
to parole supervision for a period of time greater than that provided by law
for the crime of which such person was convicted."99 However, this laudable
legislative intent was seemingly disregarded in the case of State v. Bray.'
There, where an offender was convicted of incest and sentenced to ten to fifteen
years in prison, it was held that his commitment to a state hospital for an inde-
terminate term did not constitute a more severe sentence than a vacated sentence
of ten to fifteen years in the state prison.' 0 ' The court's rationale, that the
defendant might recover and be paroled at an earlier date than he would have
had he been imprisoned, is highly questionable and furnishes another example
of the insensitivity of the legal order to the rights of the sexual psychopath.
One court has noted: "There may be a vast gulf between the objectives of
the act and its actual operation if adequate facilities and personnel are lacking
to effect its objectives."'0 2 This perceptive observation was given expression in
Commonwealth v. Page". where it was held that a sexual psychopath com-
mitted for an indefinite period to the Massachusetts treatment center which had
not in fact been established, had been invalidly deprived of his rights. Evidence
was introduced showing that persons confined there for psychiatric attention
were housed with the general prison population. In addition, there existed no
separate staff for the treatment of sex offenders; there was merely a general
97 Id. at 703.
98 The quality of treatment envisioned in the decisions of the court does not always cor-
respond with reality. The inadequacy of treatment is reflected in a report for recommended
treatment filed by an examining doctor in one of Nebraska's diagnostic centers:
TBecause of his inability to learn, this man will probably have to be maintained
in an institution for the remainder of his years. It is felt that if he were allowed
,to go back into society, and if he had the opportunities, he would do the same
things which he did prior to coming to us. However, it is felt that he should be
allowed to go to the various institutional programs and activities providing he does
not get too excited and his conduct is such that it does not embarrass anybody.
Comment, Sexual Psychopathy---A Legal Labyrinth of Medicine, Morals and Mythology, 36
NEB. L. REy. 320, 350 (1957).
99 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:164-6 (1953).
100 67 N.J.Super. 340, 170 A.2d 501 (1961).
101 Id. at 346, 170 A.2d at 504.
102 In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26, 29 (1950).
103 338 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959). Perhaps the court was influenced by the
fact that the defendant had served his term in prison and the day before he was to be dis-
charged, the district attorney reported that he was a sex offender as defined in the statute
and after examination and diagnosis, he was committed to the treatment center for an indefi-
nite term. This makes clear the convenience of this type of statute by which a criminal may
be in effect isolated from society indeterminately.
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program of group and individual psychiatric therapy for the total prison popu-
lation, which population might include sex offenders. The court found this
program plainly inadequate:
It is not sufficient that the Legislature announce a remedial purpose if the
consequences to the individual are penal. While we are not now called
upon to state the standards which such a center must observe to fulfill its
remedial purpose, we hold that a confinement in a prison which is un-
differentiated from the incarceration of convicted criminals is not remedial
so as to escape constitutional requirements of due process. 04
However, only a year later, the same court stripped the Page decision of its
meaning by holding that a treatment center which had been established only
three weeks after the decision in Page, and which was located at the correctional
institution, was adequate within the meaning of the statute.' The court dis-
pelled any doubts raised by the immediate establishment of the new center in
a rather unconvincing fashion:
It can hardly be expected that within such a brief period a smoothly
operating and adequately staffed treatment center could be established.
It is apparent that the departments of correction and mental health were
endeavoring to set up a center that would comply with the statutes. The
center established . . . leaves much to be desired .... We cannot assume
that the necessary action to establish a fully adequate treatment center,
already begun, will not be carried to completion. 06
From this it appears that good intentions are sufficient to satisfy the demands
of due process, despite the probability that meager and ineffective psychiatric
therapy is afforded.'0 7 Thus the impetus initially provided in Page has never
reached its logical extension.
Freewheeling discretion in the transfer of sexual psychopaths from treat-
ment to penal facilities is another area which has been given attention in a few
cases. Although the psychopath or serious sex offender is individually treated
by the law within an elaborate structure consisting of supposed medical attention,
by denying him the defense of insanity, the law places him in an unfortunate
situation should it be eventually decided that he is unable to benefit from the
treatment. In such event he is then often returned to prison to serve out his
104 Id. at 85.
105 Commonwealth v. Hogan, 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327, 330 (1960). The court
apparently ignored the fact that this center was separated from the rest of the hospital by
qnly double doors, and that the center was staffed by the general medical staff at the hospital.
The center was under the control of the department of correction and there were no full time
personnel assigned to the center.
106 Id. at 330. See Curran, Commitment of the Sex Offender in Massachusetts, 37 MASS.
L.Q. 58 (1952). For a criticism of the decision in Hogan, see Tenney, Sex, Sanity and Stu-
pidity in Massachusetts, 42 B.U.L. REv. 1, 19-20 '(1962).
107 See People v. Redford, 194 Cal. App.2d 200, 14 Cal.Rptr. 866, 867 (1961) where the
trial court was held to have power, in a case where one had been adjudged a sexual psycho-
path, to order execution of the prison sentence prior to commitment for treatment. This adds
further support to the mounting inference that the best interests of the psychopath are of
little importance and that the rehabilitative spirit of the legislation is secondary to the goal
of his estrangement from society.
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term."'8 The abuse of such a procedure, in which the offender may be summarily
transferred back and forth between a prison and a hospital, was exposed in Ex
parte Stone.' There the superintendent of the State Hospital had concluded
on several occasions that the petitioner was so sexually ill and mentally deranged
that neither treatment nor care could be helpful. Therefore, he was returned
to the lower court for further disposition in accordance with the statute. How-
ever, the prosecuting attorney argued that a jury trial on the criminal offense
was no longer practical since the witnesses had scattered and the memory of
the chief witness had been weakened by reason of the lapse of time. Five or
six times the court ordered the psychopath back to the hospital for as long as
he was a menace to the health and safety of others. Finally, after several years
of transfers, the court ordered an immediate trial on the criminal charge. In
so holding, the tribunal placed paramount importance on the protection of
the offender's individual freedoms even though this might contravene the pur-
pose of the statute - the protection of the community:
While it may well be said that where by lapse of time it has become prob-
able that as the result of such a trial the defendant will be acquitted and
be entitled to be restored to his liberty while still a menace to society
because of his sexual psychopathy, we cannot therefore hold that accused,
without ever being granted a trial on the charge against him, and without
the imposition of any sentence fixing a term of imprisonment, may be
incarcerated for the remainder of his life because he is such a psychopath,
or that he may be bounced from the court to the hospital and from the
hospital back to the court ad infinitum.110
This case furnishes another rare instance of judicial awareness of the rights of
the psychopath.
Similarly, the absence of any legislative directives as to the type of treat-
ment to be afforded the psychopath has resulted in another abuse -his place-
ment with the criminally insane. In Miller v. Overholser,11' the defendant was
charged with sodomy and taking indecent liberties with a child. Having been
found to be a "sexual psychopath" within the terms of the District of Columbia
statute, he was confined to Saint Elizabeth Hospital until he sufficiently recovered.
After spending some time at the hospital, he petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus and the defendant introduced evidence to the effect that he was being
kept with the criminally insane and assaulted by mentally deranged persons in
shackles thereby violating the rehabilitative spirit and purpose of the statute.
The court sustained his argument noting that widely different methods of care
are appropriate for different types of insane persons and that the defendant
was actually being confined with the hopeless and violent -"not a place of
remedial restriction.""' 2
108 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3510 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12(3) (Supp.
1964); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §2815 (1959).
109 87 Cal.App.2d 777, 197 P.2d 847 (1948).
110 Id. at 850. But see People v. Thompson, 102 Cal. App. 183, 227 P.2d 272 '(1951).
111 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
112 Id. at 419. But see People v. Barzee, 213 Cal.App.2d 139, 28 Cal.Rptr. 692 (1963)
where it was held that sexual psychopathy proceedings are essentially civil in nature, even
though the place provided for custodial care and treatment is on grounds of the state prison.
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The difficulties raised by the transfer to a penal institution of a person
committed under a civil procedure for treatment faced the Michigan Supreme
Court in In re Maddox." The issue there was whether a psychopath sentenced
to the state prison for an indefinite term was receiving treatment "in an appro-
priate state institution" within the meaning of the Michigan statute. Several
psychiatrists testified that this was the proper treatment for this specific type
of adamant violent psychopath, that the prison atmosphere provided regimenta-
tion and compelled the self-discipline necessary for the rehabilitation of such a
person. The technically civil nature of the commitment notwithstanding, the
court reasoned that the petitioner was being imprisoned for life solely on the
basis of a medical diagnosis: "We believe that incarceration in the State prison
of Southern Michigan cannot constitutionally be based upon either medical
diagnosis at a civil commitment proceedings [sic], or administrative decision
of the State hospital commission after civil commitment."1 1 4
Indeed, it seems only reasonable to conclude that confinement which
amounts to imprisonment may be ordered only after a trial which is conducted
according to the guarantees of personal liberties extended by the Constitution.
However, the decisions in Page, Stone, Miller and Maddox mark rare excep-
tions to the traditional drift of the case law which, on the whole, sanctions
abusive departures from the procedural guidelines of due process by con-
veniently depicting the entire proceeding as civil in nature. Only in an excep-
tionally well documented case, where it is irrefutably shown that the offender
is not receiving proper treatment, will a court hold otherwise.
Concomitant with the assumption that these proceedings are of a civil
nature is the well settled proposition that the commitment of a sexual psychopath
for an indeterminate period and his subsequent trial and conviction of a crime
is not violative of the prohibition against double jeopardy." 5 Again prime con-
sideration is focused upon the purpose of the legislation - the protection of
society against sexual psychopaths. The fact that one may be committed, in
some form or another, twice for the same offense yields to the overriding policy
of protection of the public.
While some statutes explicitly grant the right of a jury trial to an alleged
psychopath or sex offender,"' the judicial decisions repeatedly declare that "due
process" does not require the extension of this right to a sexual psychopath in
a proceeding to ascertain his mental condition."' Other courts resort to the
pragmatic ratiocination that the right is not a constitutional requirement in
such a special statutory proceeding."" Similarly it has been held that an alleged
sexual psychopath is not entitled to a jury determination of his psychopathy
113 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
114 Id. at 370, 88 N.W.2d at 476. Compare the decision In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313,
15 N.W.2d 652 (1944), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 767 (1946), text accompanying note 94 supra.
115 People v. Levy, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 311 P.2d 897, 900 (1957); Ex parte Keddy, 105
Cal.App.2d 215, 233 P.2d 159, 161 (1951); Commonwealth v. Dagle, 345 Mass. 539, 188
N.E.2d 450, 452 (1963); Commonwealth v. Ackers, 343 Mass. 63, 175 N.E.2d 677, 680
(1961). See statutes cited notes 80 and 81 supra.
116 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3508 "(1961).
117 People v. Hymes, 161 Cal.App.2d 668, 327 P.2d 219, 222 (1958); People v. Willey,
128 Cal.App.2d 148, 275 P.2d 522, 524 (1954). Cf. In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E.
1033 (1897).
118 In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26, 28 (1950).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
prior to trial on the criminal charge involved; no defendant is entitled, as a
matter of right, to have his status as a sexual psychopath determined prior to
sentence." 9 This is another instance in which the hapless psychopath has been
dispossessed of a fundamental right because the proceeding in which it is
asserted is ostensibly "civil" in substance.
Putting aside the discussion of the "civil" nature of psychopathy proceed-
ings and the judicial utterances consequent upon that principle, the power of
the state to define and classify sexual psychopaths has been upheld on other
grounds. Although indecisiveness and lurking ambiguity checker the various
definitions of "psychopath," "serious sex offender," etc., it has been held that
such definitions do not deny equal protection of the law since designation of a
class of sex offenders in terms of the crimes which they have committed and in
terms of mental condition is a reasonable and rational basis of classification.
In State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,"' the petitioner
attacked the Minnesota definition of "psychopathic personality" as vague and
indefinite thereby constituting invalid legislation. The State Supreme Court
had no difficulty in dismissing this contention by concluding that the definition
reasonably described and applied a clear and definite standard to a specified
class of people:
[T]he act is intended to include those persons who, by a habitual course
of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power
to control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack
or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.12
1
In affirming, the United States Supreme Court felt compelled to construe the
statute precisely as the highest court of the state had interpreted it. 2 Similar
definitions have been uniformly upheld as furnishing a reasonable and ascertain-
able standard."' That section of the Michigan statute which limits the class
of criminal sexual psychopathic persons to those charged with a criminal
offense has been held not violative of equal protection as class legislation." 4
Other alleged abuses of the sexual psychopath's rights which have grown
out of the liberally construed framework of this special legislation have taken
several particularized forms. One problem relates to the use of information
119 People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336, 246 P.2d 913, 918-19 (1952).
120 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). The present defi-
nition is identical:
The term "psychopathic presonality," as used in sections 526.09 to 526.11, means
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsive-
ness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to
appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as
to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters
and thereby dangerous to other persons. MINN. STAT. ANN. §526.09 (1945).
121 Id. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302.
122 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 273
(1940).
123 United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 235 F.Supp. 588 (W.D.Pa 1964); People
v. Levy, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957). See also People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472,
47 N.E.2d 703 (1943); Commonwealth v. Ackers, 343 Mass. 63, 175 N.E.2d 677 (1961).
124 People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942); State v. Wingler, 25 N.J.
161, 135 A.2d 468 (1957).
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obtained during the medical examination of an alleged psychopath in a sub-
sequent proceeding against him. It is again conclusively settled that the privilege
against self-incrimination offers no protection against its admissibility to de-
termine his psychopathy in the special hearing so provided. 2 ' However, it is
conceivable that during the course of the psychiatric examination, the defendant
may make disclosures which not only reflect his mental condition but which
may also disclose past criminal conduct. With awareness of this danger, one
court has held that although the defendant may not refuse to submit to the
examination, if a disclosure which tends to show a sexually psychopathic con-
dition, cannot be made without simultaneously exposing the defendant to pos-
sible criminal liability, the privilege of self-incrimination will protect the de-
fendant from making any disclosure at all."2" With similar awareness of the
overtones of self-incrimination, a few statutes declare that during the personal
examination, the alleged psychopath must answer any questions propounded by
the psychiatrists under the penalty of contempt of court, but also note that the
report filed by the psychiatrists shall not be competent evidence in any other
proceeding against the person except in a hearing to ascertain his psychopathy.'2 7
However, this protection is manifestly inadequate; if the privilege against self-
incrimination should be extended to the use of this information in the criminal
proceedings growing out of the same offense, why should this protection not also
cover the pending psychopathy hearing where unsubstantiated and unproven
prior activities may be disclosed which could prove sufficient in themselves to
place the offender in confinement indefinitely? Moreover, there is nothing to
prevent the use of information acquired through the examination as a basis for
a subsequent investigation of past crimes which may result in an ultimate con-
viction. 2 '
125 People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736, 741 (1949); State ex rel. Sweezer v.
Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897, 902 (1950); In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26,
28 (1950); In re Miller, 98 N.H. 107, 95 A.2d 116, 117 (1953). But see State v. Kirtley,
327 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Mo. 1959) (proceeding wherein realtor refused to testify during hear-
ing in which judgment creditor sought to examine realtor under oath respecting realtor's
ability to satisfy judgment): "Insofar as the Sweezer case limits the availability of the plea
of privilege against self-incrimination to a strictly 'criminal case,' as distinguished from a
civil proceeding, it is disapproved."
126 People v. English, 31 Ill.2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455, 458-59 (1964). Compare with State
v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384, 108 Pac. 934, 936 (1910).
127 D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3506(b) (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12(2)(c) (Supp.
1964); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3404(a) (Supp. 1965); MAicn. STAT. ANN. §28.967(4) (1954).
There exists, however, a possibility that under a statute granting this immunity, a defendant
might insure himself against future prosecution by disclosing all past crimes to the doctors.
Consequently it has been recommended that the report should always be denied the prose-
cutor so as to defeat such a broad immunity. See Note, Constitutional Law--Indiana Sexual
Psychopath Statute, 25 IND. L.J. 186, 188 '(1950).
128 However, that such information can be so used runs counter to the spirit of the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563, 585-86
(1892):
It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not be
compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give testimony which will
tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures. . . . We
are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject
to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the
effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United
States. . . . In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be
valid must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to
which the question relates.
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Extraordinary liberality is extended by the case law to the manner in which
the medical examination and accompanying expert testimony may be intro-
duced into evidence at the hearing. That portion of the Pennsylvania statute
which denies a defendant the right to examine the psychiatric report, learn of
its contents or rebut any statements contained therein, has been upheld as not
violative of due process." 9 Although the results of the medical examination
are often the sole basis upon which a determination of psychopathy is made, it
has been held by the Supreme Court of Nebraska that the testimony of a
physician who examined the defendant was admissible at the hearing even
though the physician admitted that he had seen a list of the defendant's past
violations before he made his examination." In Commonwealth v. Dagle" -
it was held that although the examining psychiatrist did not answer unqualifiedly,
as the statute required, that if the prisoner were released he would be likely to
commit an act of violence or aggression, his testimony that the prisoner would
have great difficulty controlling his sexual impulses, which "might" result in
violence, was sufficient to preclude his release: "It was not necessary that this
witness testify in the precise words of the statute. Careful physicians, by train-
ing and experience, are guarded in prognosis.""' 2 The Illinois Supreme Court
has recently construed the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, which provides for
the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists to examine the defendant, not
to require that both should testify, and the testimony of one may establish a
prima facie case in the absence of contradictory reports."' In a proceeding to
determine whether the defendant was a sexually dangerous person, opinions of
examining psychiatrists drawn from a study of records from a correctional
institution have been held admissible in Massachusetts although based on hear-
say."
34
The constitutionality of the legislation as a whole has remained intact. It
becomes increasingly apparent that the mentally deranged sex offender receives
judicial recognition of his personal rights only in the rarest of instances where
129 United States ex tel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 235 F.Supp. 588 (W.D.Pa. 1964).
130 State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383, 133 N.W.2d 583, 590 (1965).
131 345 Mass. 539, 188 N.E.2d 450 (1963).
132 Id. at 453.
133 People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill.2d 306, 205 N.E.2d 625, 629 (1965). But see People v.
Wasker, 353 Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1958), where in similar proceedings it was
held error to receive the testimony of three examining psychiatrists, whose evidence had been
tainted by their reception of information gained by one of them in his confidential relation-
ship as the defendant's personal psychiatrist.
134 Commonwealth v. McGruder, 205 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Mass. 1965). See also In re
Mundy, 97 N.H. 239, 85 A.2d 371, 375 (1952), where an expert at the hearing to determine
the psychopathy of the accused was allowed to relate the substance of reports made by the
police and probation departments. The reports contained extra-judicial statements by certain
minors purporting to describe conduct on the part of the defendants which prompted the
criminal charges. These hearsay statements were relied upon by the witness as a basis for his
opinion that the defendants were sexual psychopaths, and the defendants were found not to be
entitled to cross-examine these witnesses because of waiver. This result becomes all the more
unfair in view of the New Hampshire statute which explicitly relates: "The county attorney
shall appear for the examining board and cause witnesses to be subpoenaed, if necessary, in
support of the report." N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. §173:5 (repl. vol. 1964). Surely the holding
contravenes the legislative scheme. See also In re Craft, 99 N.H. 287, 109 A.2d 853, 855
(1954), where the same court found that due process is not denied in requiring a defendant to
submit to an examination by a board of medical experts without notice of a right to be heard.
"An individual's right of personal liberty is subject to such restriction as is reasonably necessary
for the common welfare of society."
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he can establish a flagrant constitutional deprivation. Thus where the defendant
introduced an affidavit of his brother to the effect that he was a sexual psycho-
path and the reports of doctors describing him as a homosexual with a pre-
disposition for engaging in indecent acts of a most shocking nature, it was held
error to deny him a full hearing on the issue.' In People v. Artinian,5 6 a
petition *fled by the prosecuting attorney, alleging that the defendant was a
criminal sexual psychopathic person, was ruled fatally defective rendering the
subsequent proceedings invalid where it contained no allegation of a factual
nature tending to show the correctness of such conclusion. Moreover, it has
been held prejudicial error and violative of due process in 'a sexual psychopathy
proceeding to admit the confessions of the defendant to a sex murder without
a preliminary showing of the voluntary nature of the confession. 3 The Illinois
Supreme Court again demonstrated its occasional sensitivity to the rights of
the luckless psychopath in People v. Nastasio... where it found erroneous in, a
psychopathy proceeding the admission of a-- deposition taken outside of the
presence of the defendant although the defendant had been represented by
counsel at the time the deposition was taken. Surprisingly, the court decided
that the defendant could be prejudiced by his own absence because his sugges-
tions to his attorney might well prove indispensable for an effective cross-
examination. 3
9
135 People v. Barnett, 27 Cal.2d 649, 166 P.2d 4, 8 (1946). See also Hobbs v. Cochran,
143 So.2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1962), where it was ruled that the trial court should have ordered
psychiatric examination where the accused sexual deviate pleaded "guilty due to insanity,"
and the state attorney stated that he knew of no process for a psychiatric examination.
136 320 Mich. 441, 31 N.W.2d 688, 689 (1948). Other courts have imposed various
restrictions upon the petition alleging psychopathy. See State ex rel. Savery v. Criminal
Court of Marion County, 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E.2d 128 (1955) (proceedings under the
sexual psychopath statute are not proper as to a person charged with a crime other than a
sex offense); In re Carter, 337 Mich. 496, 60 N.W.2d 433, 434 (1953) (prosecuting attorney's
petition requesting a psychiatric examination under the sexual psychopath law was insuf-
ficient where the petition at most alleged that the plaintiff had been accused of sex crimes
on previous occasions but not that he had ever been convicted, or his guilt established);
Wood v. Hansen, .268 Wis. 165, 66 N.W.2d 722, 723 (1954) '(a person convicted of dis-
orderly conduct involving -the use of indecent and obscene language is not within the scope
of the statute providing for treatment of sex deviates). But see, People v. Holnagel, 371
Mich. 347, 123 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1963) (defendant's petition alleging that he had had
sexual intercourse on some twelve occasions with casual strangers, and abducted and sexually
molested a woman entirely unknown to him, was held not to warrant a declaration that he
was a criminal psychopath).
137 People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776, 779 (1957):
[I]t is of little significance that the proceedings are civil in nature. A defendant
found to be a sexually dangerous person under the Act is deprived of his liberty as
a consequence, and must be accorded the protections of due process in his trial.
See also Ex parte Keddy, 105 Cal.App.2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951) (sexual'psychopath held
entitled as matter of right to release on bail). But cf. People v. Morgan, 146 Cal.App.2d 722,
304 P.2d 138, 139 (1956) where no violation of the right against self-incrimination or the pro-
tection against an unreasonable search and seizure was found to exist when a defendant charged
with an infamous crime against nature had been taken in flagrante delicto by police and
transported to a hospital where the doctor, without objection, took from his private parts
fecal matter from which the doctor made smears and slides which were subsequently intro-
duced into evidence. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
138 19 Ill.2d 524, 168 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1960).
139 Id. at 530, 168 N.E.2d at 731. See also People v. McDonald, 44 Ill.App.2d 348, 194
N.E.2d 541, 544 (1963): "We conclude from the Supreme Court's expressions in the Capoldi
and Nastasio cases that the provisions of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act should be
afforded the same strict construction as penal statutes." See also People v. Olmstead, 32
Ill.2d 306, 205 N.E.2d 625' (1965), where the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In general, the inescapable fact remains that the precedents are uniform
and nearly unanimous in upholding the paper validity of these statutes. Although
courts strike them down in particular instances where there is an obvious and
manifest abuse of the rights of the individual, the recent decision in Common-
wealth v. Peterson4 0 indicates that the courts will nevertheless extend their
general approbation even to situations in which there has been a glaring mis-
application of discretion. Here a prisoner who had been convicted of assault
with a dangerous weapon on a police officer was found not to have been un-
constitutionally deprived of his liberty by his confinement to a treatment center
for a period up to life as a sexually dangerous person following proceedings
initiated by the prison superintendent even though he was not serving a sentence
for any sexual offense, had no record of conviction for sexual offenses and there
was no evidence of sexual misbehavior while in prison. 4' Thus it is clear that
many innocent victims, who because of their illness are unable to legally contest
their own rights, are being indiscriminately trampled upon. It must be borne
in mind that this legislation has a most sweeping impact and a judicial willing-
ness to conclude that constitutional requirements have been satisfied has far-
reaching consequences -a gloomy and hopeless confinement for an extremely
long period of time.
IV. Sociological and Medical Criticism
There is widespread agreement among medical and sociology experts that
the condition of sexual psychopathy or a related psychosis as defined by these
special statutes lacks any accurate or sufficient criteria for purposes of an effec-
tive psychiatric diagnosis. 2 This naturally stems from the fact that ". . . psy-
chiatrists themselves are in wide disagreement as to the connotations of the term
right to a trial by jury was available to an indigent defendant applying for discharge on the
basis of his recovery. The court significantly remarked:
To hold otherwise would be to permit the State to forever hold in confinement
a defendant found to be sexually dangerous at the sole discretion of the officers of
the State. The right of the individual, as protected by the provisions of this act, do
not so intend.
205 N.E.2d at 630.
140 205 N.E.2d 719 (Mass. 1965).
141 Id. at 721.
142 BiGas, THE GUILTY MIND 164 (1st ed. 1955); DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 109
(1952); DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, CALIFORNIA SEXUAL DEVIATION RESEARCH 20
(Final Report, March, 1954) '(hereinafter referred to as CALIFORNIA REPORT); ELIS &
BRANCALE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX OFFENDERS 37-41 (1956); GREENACRE, TRAUMA,
GROWTH, AND PERSONALITY 165 (1st ed. 1952); KERR, FORENSIC MEDICINE 212 (6th ed.
1957); NoYps, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 504 (1940); PLOSCOWE, SEx AND THE LAW
228-29 (1st ed. 1951); Apfelberg, Pfeffer and Sugar, Psychiatric Study of 250 Sex Offenders,
100 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 762 (1944); Cason, The Psychopath and the Psychopathic, 4 J.
CRIM. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 522 (1943); Cason, The Symptoms of the Psychopath, 61 PUBLIC
HEALTH REPORTS 1833 (1946); Cavanagh, Sexual Anomalies and the Law, 9 CATHOLIC
LAW. 4, 28 (1963); Hacker and Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A Critical
Discussion, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 766, 772 (1955); Karpman, The Sexual Psychopath, 146
J.A.M.A. 721, 722 (1951); Mihm, A Re-examination of the Validity of Our Sex Psychopath
Statutes in the Light of Recent Appeal Cases and Experience, 44 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 716,
731-32 (1954); Niswander, Some Aspects of "Sexual Psychopath" Examinations in New
Hampshire, 4 N.H. BAR J. 66, 73-74 (1962); Slough and Schwinn, The Sexual Psychopath,
19 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 131, 138 n. 24 (1951); Slovenko and Super, The Mentally Dis-
abled, the Law and the Report of the American Bar Foundation, 47 VA. L. REV. 1366, 1381
(1961); Comment, Sexual Deviation and the Laws of Ohio, 20 OHIo ST. L. J. 346, 357
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psychopath."' 43  The American Psychiatric Association has described a psy-
chopath as
a person whose behavior is predominantly amoral or antisocial and char-
acterized by impulsive irresponsible actions satisfying only immediate or
narcissistic interest without concern for obvious and implicit social conse-
quences accompanied by minimal outward evidence of anxiety or guilt.
Increasingly considered a poor and inexact term. 44
The term and the condition described are thus medically inexact and the
examining psychiatrist has no intelligible standards by which he may make any
scientific conclusions as to whether a person is a psychopath: "The psychiatrists
have no diagnostic instruments or criteria by which to arrive at demonstrable
conclusions on this question; they are expected to make expert judgments on
questions on which neither they nor others are qualified to speak as experts."' 4
Because the legislation has no scientific basis, medical science finds itself in a
state of bewilderment as to the proper and exact identification of the conduct
described in the statutes:
The present state of confusion and disagreement among psychiatric authori-
ties about the large group of conditions known officially as personality
pattern disorders makes it impossible for psychiatry to supply the precise,
easily applicable definitions and diagnostic criteria needed for the type
of sex offender laws now being written.'4
This confusion of the legislators is evidenced clearly by the highly varied
forms into which the statutory definitions have fallen. 47 One court has rec-
ognized the legal insufficiency of the statutory definition but resorted to a con-
veniently pragmatic proposition to overlook it:
While the definition of "sexual psychopath" contained in the statute is
somewhat general, considering our present knowledge in the field of mental
sciences, any specific definition would unduly fetter expansion and experi-
mentation in the field.' 48
The all-inclusiveness which characterizes the statutory definitions has prompted
one author to remark:
Most important, sexual psychopath legislation is deficient in that it
lacks a scientific foundation. It is fallacious to group biological disorders
together simply because they share one symptom.... In numerous studies
of so-called sex offenders, there is found among them psychopathic person-
(1959). See generally Note, The Psychopathic Personality: Treatment and Punishment Alter-
natives Under Current and Proposed Criminal Responsibility Criteria, 10 RUTGERS L. REv.
425 (1955).
143 TAPPAN, REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY COMMIssION ON THE HABITUAL SEX OF-
FENDER 37 '(1950) (hereinafter referred to as the NEW JERSEY REPORT).
144 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 38 (1957).
145 Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIms. L. & C. 543, 551-52 (1950).
146 Bowman and Rose, A Criticism of Current Usage of the Term "Sexual Psychopath,"
109 Am. J. PSYcHATRY 177, 179 (1952).
147 See statutes cited notes 16-21 supra.
148 People v. Levy, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 311 P.2d 897, 902 '(1957).
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alities, schizoid personalities, alcoholics, neurotics, schizophrenics, persons
with chronic brain damage, mental defectives, and others. Some persons
with sexual problems may obtain sexual pleasure by committing arson or
by plunging a knife into a woman's back.14 9
If the medical profession is unable to identify the person afflicted by the condition
enunciated within the statutory framework, it is absurd to expect a judge to
compensate for this miserable failure of the legislature by creating out of thin
air a workable diagnostic entity by which the psychiatrically deviated sex offender
can be fairly isolated. The court finds itself in a dilemma which it is ill-equipped
to resolve and therefore must rely almost exclusively on the recommendation of
the examining doctors:
Even though examination skill is not a uniform part of the armamentarium
of psychiatrists, and many psychiatrists are really not adept in this area,
the law will accept the opinion of the psychiatrist, almost in blind faith.
The only real challenge to the expert's opinion is another opinion, so that
decisions all too frequently become a matter of numbers, that is, two or
three out of three opinions clinches it. The quality of these opinions be-
comes a secondary matter -the presumption is that all psychiatrists have
equal weight.150
Hence, innocent and harmless people are often subjected to indeterminate con-
finement by a legislative distortion in which the blind are leading the blind.
The difficulty in enforcing this legislation is compounded by the fact that
there exists no effective program of therapeutic treatment for the mentally
abnormal sex offender. Sexual offenders are not given any individual form of
intensive psychotherapy, 5 ' and authorities have decried the deplorable scarcity
of adequately trained personnel. 2 Even where facilities may be available, the
treatment has been found to be "purely custodial."' 55 The inadequacy of treat-
ment has been said to stem from the lack of enough qualified doctors to ad-
minister the treatment and the inability of medical science to help the majority
of sexual psychopaths. 4 The treatment center in Massachusetts has been de-
scribed in unflattering terms: "For the treatment of sexually dangerous persons
the physical plant is grossly inadequate despite its being well maintained, and
this fact is readily acceded to by both the custodial and the mental health
staffs." '155 While the sexual psychopath is differentiated from the normal crim-
inal offender, isolated, and subjected to confinement for life on the theory that
149 Slovenko and Phillips, Psychosexuality and the Criminal Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 797,
823 (1962).
150 Meyers, Psychiatric Examination of the Sexual Psychopath, 56 J. Cuia. L., & P.S. 27,
27-28 (1965). See generally Primum non nocere: How to Treat the Criminal Psychopath,
52 A.B.A.J. 69 (1966).
151 Hacker and Frym, supra note 142, at 773. See also, DiFuria and Mees, Dangerous to
be at Large-A Constructive Critique of Washington's Sexual Psychopath Law, 38 WASH.
L. REV. 531 (1963).
152 LINDoAN & MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, 306-08 (1961). See
also PLoscowE, op. cit. supra note 142, at 235-37.
153 NEW JERSEY REPORT 32. See also REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION
ON THE DEVIATED CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER 146 (Michigan, 1951).
154 LINDMAN AND MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 142, at 307.
155 Tenney, Sex, Sanity and Stupidity in Massachusetts, 42 B.U.L. REv. 1, 20 (1962).
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he is being "treated" not "punished" the fact that such treatment is actually
"nonexistent" in any accurate or meaningful sense of the term, renders this
legislation a nullity.
While there is no worthwhile treatment available to the psychopath, it must
also be mentioned that it is generally the opinion of experts that confinement
or imprisonment does not benefit the dangerous sex offender nor does it operate
to deter his sexual abnormalities."' Moreover, by placing many sexual deviates
together, the legislation actually promotes sexual perversion.
This special legislation is premised upon the notion that most sex offenders
who engage in compulsive and repetitive acts of sexual deviation are dangerous
and will continue to commit these acts, but investigations show the contrary-
there is in fact a low degree of recidivism among sexual offenders.' One report
has concluded: "Not more than about 5 % of convicted sex offenders are danger-
ous.""" Nor is there any basis for the common belief that sex criminals engage
in crimes of progressive seriousness.5 " The identification of mental illness with
the commission of a sexual crime has not been established:
The preponderance of persons who carry out sex offenses for which
they are punishable by our current laws are not involved in behavior fumda-
mentally different from that commonplace in the population; such persons
are not necessarily to be regarded as suffering with psychiatric disorders
or as socially dangerous ' 6 0
Moreover, it has been shown that jurisdiction under several of these statutes
may be gained by a charge or conviction of a "criminal sex offense'' by a
charge or conviction of "any crime' 6 2 or even without a charge or conviction
of any crime where a person having knowledge has sufficient reason to believe
that the person is a sexually dangerous person or a sexual psychopath.' 3 Thus
many of the statutes fail to differentiate between the serious and the nonserious
sex offender with the result that the nuisance type sex offender may face in-
definite incarceration:
156 Bowie and Williamson, The Sexual Psychopath: An Unsolved Problem in Texas, 38
TExAs L. Rxv. 915, 916 (1960). See generally Tappan, Some Myths about the Sex Offend-
er, 19 FED. PROBATION 7 (1955); Wall and Wylie,. Institutional and Post-Institutional Treat-
ment of the Sex Offender, 2 VAND. L. Rzv. 47 (1948).
'157 GUTTMACHER, SEX OFFENSES 113-14 (1951); CALIFORNIA REPORT 100; LINDMAN
AND MCINTYRE, Op. cit. supra note 142, at 304; NEw JERSEY REPORT 13-14; Atcheson and
Williams, A Study of Juvenile Sex Offenders, 111 Am. J. PSYCHATRY 366, 368-69 (1954);
Fahr, Iowa's New Sexual Psychopath Law-An Experiment Noble in Purpose? 41 IowA L.
REv. 523, 528 (1956); Hacker and Frym, supra note 154, at 771; Slovenko and Phillips,
supra note 149, at 826 n. 84; Tappan, Sentences for Sex Criminals, 42 J. CmM. L., C. & P.S.
332, 336 (1951); Note, Criminal Law-Wisconsin's Sexual Deviate Act, 1954 Wis. L. REv.
324, 327.
158 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON SEX OFFENDERS TO THE SIXTY-EIGHTH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 11 (1951) (hereinafter referred to as the
ILLINOIS REPORT).
159 Id. at 11-19. See also GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 111-
14 (1st ed. 1952); Naw JERSEY REPORT 14.
160 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRICALLY DEVIATED SEx
OFFENDERS 1 '(Report No. 9 Feb., 1950).
161 See statutes cited notes 23-27 supra.
162 See statutes cited notes 31-33 supra.
163 See statutes cited note 34 supra.
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The tranvestite, the exhibitionist, the frotteur, the homosexual who mastur-
bates another either in the privacy of his bedroom or in a public toilet,
the "peeping tom" -are typical of large numbers of sex offenders who
are threatened with long-term incarceration by present sexual psychopath
legislation. And what is even worse is that such legislation has not usually
been implemented by facilities for treatment. The result is that many
nuisance-type, nondangerous sex offenders have been imprisoned for long
periods of time, without treatment, in those jurisdictions where such laws
have been enforced. 6 4
This situation has caused one author to suggest that a better use of the inde-
terminate sentence could be made by applying it to the armed robber who is
more of a public menace than the nondangerous sex offender." 5 Not too far-
fetched is this situation which plausibly might result from a strict enforcement
of one of these statutes:
A man who stopped his car on a rural road, and who got out in order to
urinate, is arrested for open lewdness. No psychiatrist is willing to swear
that is not a sex psychopath, because that kind of negative diagnosis cannot
be proved. The "offender" is then placed in a state hospital, not to be
released until he is certified as cured. However, no hospital official can risk
issuing a certificate that he will never commit a sex offense for the rest
of his life. The net result is life imprisonment (in a hospital, but in con-
finement none the less) for a man whose only offense was having a full
bladder at an inopportune time.16
There can be no justification for the indeterminate confinement of a "peeper"
or his harmless equivalent to a hospital; protection must be imposed against
the infliction of a serious punishment in which liberty and due process are
vitally involved. 7 Punishment must remain reasonably commensurate with
the act involved. The legislation, as it exists in many jurisdictions, is in large
164 Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
217, 223 (1960).
165 Slovenko and Phillips, supra note 149, at 823.
166 DAviDsoN, op. cit. supra note 142, at 112-13.
167 Nnw JERSEY REPORT 33: "Is there any value in providing for diagnosis of a novel
category of mental aberration and for commitment to psychiatric hospitals if these patients
are then to be held for prolonged periods without receiving any special treatment?" Since
the confinement of a harmless offender may depend on the opinions of psychiatrists who are
ill equipped to make any accurate diagnosis, one may easily be deprived of his liberty without
any well reasoned basis. A report given by a court appointed psychiatrist in Indiana brings
this abuse to light:
I examined D at - County jail on 3/10/55. His statement to me was as follows:
While sitting on a toilet in the NYC depot at -, Ind., he fell asleep at 7:30
p.m. He was arrested by NYC police while in the toilet. Three hours later while
walking on the streets of - he was arrested by the - police, taken to the
station and under force (by club and fist) forced to sign a confession of his guilt of
sodomy.
He said there were no witnesses or no complaint filed to his knowledge and
that he was railroaded into signing the paper.
He stated that he was 33 years old, unmarried and not regularly employed. He
said he went to school for 12 grades but never went to high school and that he quit
school when he was 22 years of age.
His whole story was fantastic and I considered him a chronic liar.
In my opinion there is no cure for this man and he should be sent to prison
rather than a hospital for treatment.
Cohen, Administration of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Statute in Indiana, 32 IND. L. J.
450, 461 (1957).
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part unenforceable: "Absolute law enforcement would perforce touch about
95% of the total male population." '168
A final indication of dissatisfaction with this legislation is the infrequency
with which it has been applied. Only sixteen persons were committed under
the Illinois law during the first ten years following its enactment. 6 " From
1949 through 1956, the Indiana statute was applied "very sparingly . . . and
not uniformly utilized by the courts."" A New Hampshire doctor has reported:
Of 161 examinations for commitment, conducted over a period of three years
from 1958 through and including 1960, only 12 (7%) of those examined were
found to be a "sexual psychopath" within the meaning of the New Hampshire
statute and recommended for further treatment. Only 3 (1.7%) were found
to be suffering from mental illness and were then committed to the State Hos-
pital for treatment.' From 1947 through 1952, only one person had been
found to be a sexual psychopath within the meaning of the Massachusetts
statute. 7 2 Discontent with the legislation is unmistakable.
V. Conclusion
While the advance of medical science into the law is most commendable,
it remains the task of the lawmaker to coordinate and organize the available
scientific knowledge into his legislative scheme in a fair and meaningful manner.
Legal directives must not be framed upon hastily assumed postulates of current
science. The legislator must determine with exactness the medical knowledge
available for an effective operation of the legislation. The sexual psychopath laws
define with elusiveness and vagueness the sexual misbehavior with which they
are concerned; the statutes themselves have been shown to be inconsistently and
divergently composed, lacking in uniformity and homogeneity. They are con-
sistent only in their effect; one is deprived of personal freedoms and confined
indefinitely on the subjective conclusions of unqualified experts who are making
their diagnoses without any concrete touchstone, without any point of reference.
By attempting to transform what is already an inadequate medical concept into
a precise legal definition, the legislators have inextricably meshed mutually op-
posed elements of treatment and punishment into a maze and confusing labyrinth
of uncertainty and obscurity in which an individual presented with an uncon-
firmed charge of window peeping or indecent exposure may be confined for
the rest of his life. By summarily labeling the proceeding as one "civil" in nature,
the courts are placing defenseless individuals in a hospital or prison for inde-
terminate terms. Indeed, the indefinite sentences and the extraordinary dis-
cretion which characterize most of the statutes, represent a noble yet futile
attempt to compensate for the acute lack of knowledge which surrounds the
168 GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT or PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRICALLY DEvIATED SEx
OFFENDERS 2 (Report No. 9, Feb., 1950).
169 Comment, The Illinois Proposal to Confine Sexually Dangerous Persons, 40 J. Cium.
L., C. & P.S. 186, 186-87 (1949).
170 Cohen, supra note 167, at 466.
171 Niswander, supra note 142, at 73.
172 Curran, Commitment of the Sex Offender in Massachusetts, 37 MAss. L. Q. 58, 63
(1952).
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sexual psychopath, his motivations, his propensities and his treatment. It be-
comes increasingly apparent that if the legislatior is to satisfy the objections
raised by the arguments of due process, equal protection, double jeopardy, etc.,
it is absolutely imperative that they provide a qualified caliber of personnel and
therapy since the courts have consistently given prime consideration to the
remedial nature of the legislation. But the treatment has been shown to be
grossly inadequate and deficient, the legislation is an operational failure and
what is improperly termed "civil treatment" evolves in fact into "punitive
imprisonment." A theoretical designation of a statute as "civil" cannot shield
its substantive effect; within the context of this legislation, forced hospitalization
is forced incarceration.
Whether civil or criminal, the psychopathy hearings are one-sided affairs
in which many fundamental constitutional rights are unjustly denied the de-
fendant because of social expediency; society is being protected but at the
expense and misfortune of the offender. We must be keenly mindful of the fact
that the alleged psychopath may have his liberties curtailed under the provisions
of one of these "civil" proceedings even though he may be innocent of the
criminal charge raised against him in the information or indictment. Although
the need for the legislation has been shown to be problematical at best, the fact
is that such laws have been passed and must be administered equally and
impartially for only if every man is accorded the same protections and liberties
can the nourishing spirit of our jurisprudence be sustained. If the law is going
to isolate a person, whether it be through a "civil" or "criminal" proceeding,
the defendant is entitled to that degree of procedural protection which is com-
mensurate with the penalty to be imposed. While the legislation marks the
beginning perhaps of an enlightened solution for a most intricate and challeng-
ing problem, this remains a highly objectionable area of law which necessarily
demands a meticulous re-examination and re-definition of the existing legal
machinery; orientated toward a harmonious coalescence of a progressive science
of psychiatry with traditional concepts of substantive due process.
Michael B. Roche
ADDENDUM
Subsequent to the submission of this note for publication, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in deciding United States ex rel.
Gerchman v. Maroney' has given expression to several arguments advanced
supra by reversing the holding in the district court 74 where the petitioner, who
had been confined under the Pennsylvania Sex Offender Act for an indefinite
period, had been denied a writ of habeas corpus. The opinion of the district
court has been cited several times supra as authority for the well-established
proposition that psychopathy or related proceedings are civil in nature. Thus
during a hearing to ascertain whether an individual, convicted of the crime of
assault with intent to ravish, was a "person who, if at large, would constitute
173 No. 15221, 3d Cir., January 11, 1966.
174 United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 235 F.Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
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a threat of bodily harm to members of the public,.. the offender was not
entitled to the rights of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and
trial by jury.
In reversing the lower court, the Third Circuit, despite an acute absence
of directly applicable precedents, shattered the long standing tradition that such
proceedings are civil in nature. In abandoning the customary reference to
convenient pragmatics by which such proceedings had been disguised as civil
and as rehabilitative or reformative in nature, the court concluded:
The Act leaves no doubt, both in its language and its purpose, that it is
a criminal statute and that what is imposed under its authority is criminal
punishment. Its title and its text are replete with language which reveals
that the proceeding is penal in nature. It may be invoked only after a
precedent conviction of guilty of one of the specified crimes and prescribes
a new and radically different punishment. A maximum sentence of life
imprisonment is made on the determination by the Pennsylvania Board of
Parole that the "interest of justice" so dictates176
In what may well prove to be a landmark decision, the court contrasted the
confinement under the Sex Offender Act "for a minimum term of one day
and a maximum term of life" with the maximum confinement of five years for
the crime of assault with intent to ravish and found the procedure and conse-
quent sentencing not civil but essentially an independent criminal proceeding-
a "much enlarged punishment for an essentially independent criminal offense." 7
Having characterized the proceeding as one "criminal" in nature, the court
found no difficulty in logically extending this determination to the interrelated
rights of cross-examination and confrontation accorded an accused in a criminal
trial. The court reasoned that the petitioner was entitled to a complete judicial
hearing at which he must be allowed to cross-examine and confront witnesses
against him:
At such a hearing the requirements of due process cannot be satisfied by
partial or niggardly procedural protections. A defendant in such a proceed-
ing is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which due
process guarantees in state criminal proceedings. He must be afforded all
those safeguards which are fundamental rights and essential to a fair trial,
including the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him 178
By ordering a new trial, the court avoided a conclusive determination of
the petitioner's right of trial by jury since it thus refrained from deciding whether
the right, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment, is within the ambit of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, the court left no doubt
as to the result if the sixth amendment is applicable to the states: "What we have
already said makes it clear that the guarantee of jury trial would apply to a
175 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1166 (1964).
176 United States ex re. Gerchman v. Maroney, No. 15221, 3d Cir., January 11, 1966,
at 12.
177 Id. at 14-15.
178 Id. at 17.
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Barr-Walker proceeding if the Fourteenth Amendment makes it applicable in
state criminal cases."' 79
The court also considered the claim that the Pennsylvania statute was con-
stitutionally invalid on its face not essential to its holding and concluded further
that the petitioner would have sufficient opportunity to challenge its constitu-
tional validity in the state courts.
Although the decision marks an enlightened breakthrough, the court did
limit its scope by explicitly noting that its rationale would not apply to those
statutes which, unlike the Pennsylvania statute, do not require a conviction of a
crime as a basis for jurisdiction. Nevertheless, by formulating a well-reasoned
and cogent indictment of this exceptional statute and by raising a powerful voice
of dissent in the legal maze of vacillation and indifference, this decision may
well furnish the point of departure for a closer scrutiny and overdue analysis
of related legislation. By its unequivocal characterization of the proceeding as
one independently criminal in nature, the decision represents a long-awaited
ray of light casting new hope into the gloomy world of the sexual psychopath.
APPENDIX
States where special sex-offender legislation is presently in force:
Alabama ............................................ ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§434-442 (1959) and (Supp. 1963).
California ............................................ CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§5500-5522 (1966).
Colorado _...-......................................... COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§39-19-1-39-19-10 (1963).
Connecticut .................. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§17-244---17-257 (1958) and (Supp. 1964).
District of Columbia ........................................ D.C. CODE ANN. §§22-3501-22-3511 '(1961).
Florida ....................................................................... FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12 (Supp. 1964).
Illinois .................................... ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§105-1-105-12 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
Indiana ..................... IND. ANN. STAT. §§9-3401-9-3412 (repl. vol. 1956) and (Supp. 1965).
Iowa ................................................... IOWA CODE ANN. §§225A.1-225A.15 '(Supp. 1964).
Kansas .................................................. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§62-1534--62-1537 (1964).
Massachusetts ................................................. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§1-11 (1965).
Michigan ................................................. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§28.967(1)-28.967(9) (1954).
Minnesota ........................................................... MINN. STAT. ANN. §§526.09-526.11 (1945).
Missouri ............................................................ Mo. ANN. STAT. §§202.700-202.770 (1959).
Nebraska ............................................................. NEB. REv. STAT. §§29-2901-29-2907 (1964).
New Hampshire ........................... N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§173:1-173:16 '(repl. vol. 1964).
New Jersey ......................... N.J. STAT  ANN. §§2A:164-3-164-13 (1953) and (Supp. 1964).
Ohio ......... OHO REv. CODE ANN. §§2947.24-2947.29 (Page 1954) and (Page Supp. 1964).
Oregon ...................................................... ORE. REv. STAT. §§137.11-137.19 (Supp. 1963).
Pennsylvania ..................................................... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§1166-1174 (1964).
South Dakota .......... ..................... ...................................... S.D. CODE §13.1727 (Supp. 1960).
Tennessee ............................................. TENN. CODE ANN. §§33-1301-33-1305 (Supp. 1965).
Utah - ....... ............. UTAH CODE ANN. §§77-49-1-77-49-8 (1953) and (Supp. 1965).
Virginia ........................................... VA. CODE ANN. §§53-278.2-53-278.3 (repl. vol. 1958).
Vermont ............................................................ VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§2811-2816 (1959).
Washington .................................. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§71.06.010-71.06.260 (1962).
West Virginia ........................................................... W.VA. CODE ANN. §§2666-2672 (1961).
Wisconsin .............................................. WIS. STAT. ANN. §959.15 (1958) and (Supp. 1965).
Wyoming ........................................ WYo. STAT. ANN. §§7-348--7-362 '(1957) and (Supp. 1965).
179 Id. at 18; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
